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I. Introduction 
Do you want to work from home and make money quickly?  
Interested in being your own boss?  Familiar to many, these 
questions are exemplary of the “network marketing” techniques 
often relied upon by direct sales companies, particularly multi-level 
marketing companies (“MLMs”), to sell products and recruit new 
participants.1  MLMs, which employ a multi-level commission 
structure, are commonly conflated with their illegal counterpart, the 
pyramid scheme, since both models bear verticalized, multi-level 
structures.2  Direct selling, including the MLM business model, 
holds a longstanding global economic position which remains alive 
and well today.3 
Despite China’s 2005 regulatory regime barring all companies 
 
 1 See Adam Epstein, Multi-Level Marketing and its Brethren: The Legal and 
Regulatory Environment in the Down Economy, 12 ATLANTIC L. J. 91, 91 (2010). 
 2 See id. at 102, 104–06 (describing the “upline-downline structure” as the key 
distinction between “a legitimately successful MLM” and an illegitimate, illegal pyramid 
scheme, and providing an overview of the factors used by the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”) when deciding which category a business falls under); see also Multi-Level 
Marketing Businesses and Pyramid Schemes, FED. TRADE COMM’N, (Oct. 2019), 
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0065-multi-level-marketing-businesses-and-
pyramid-schemes [https://perma.cc/K8Y9-422Y]. 
 3 Yuexin Miao, The Dilemma of Direct Selling in China, 37 ADVANCES IN ECON., 
BUS., & MGMT. RSCH. 393, 393 (2017) (“As an industry, globally, direct selling has a 
history nearly 100 years [old], but in fact the concept of direct selling is not clear.”).  See 
also infra Section III-A-1 (recounting the historical context and progression of China’s 
relationship with international direct sales).  Direct selling is a $193 USD billion industry 
worldwide that encompasses 118.4 million independent representatives.  WORLD FED’N OF 
DIRECT SELLING ASS’NS, FACT SHEET 1 (2019), https://wfdsa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/04/Fact-Sheet-page-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GUZ-4YXX] 
[hereinafter FACT SHEET]. 
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with multi-level business models from market entry, certain societal 
and economic factors put Mainland China4 among the most 
desirable markets for international direct selling companies.5  
Various enforcement actions and investigations demonstrate the 
level of risk these companies assume to gain Chinese market access 
without abandoning the customary multi-level business model or 
acquiescing to other compliance burdens.6 
As a matter of positive law, MLMs are commonly confused with 
their illegal counterparts, pyramid schemes.7  Nevertheless, MLMs 
maintain a secure position in the global economy, primarily due to 
“legitimate direct selling business opportunities for non-salaried, 
independent business owners in the United States and around the 
world.”8  In reality, direct selling and MLMs are notorious for 
corruption and deceit, resulting in financial losses for their 
“employees.”9  In China, there is longstanding suspicion towards 
direct selling.10  In 2017, this suspicion increased again when 
 
 4 While finalizing this Note, the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s 
Congress passed a national security law for Hong Kong (theretofore a Special 
Administrative Region of China).  China: National Security Law Must Not Become a 
Weapon of Fear, AMNESTY INT’L (June 30, 2020), 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/06/china-national-security-law-weapon-of-
fear/ [https://perma.cc/E3JR-3KK7].  Because the economic effects of this law remain 
unseen, “China,” as used in this Note, refers only to Mainland China: the geographic area 
under rule of the People’s Republic of China, excluding Hong Kong.  See id; see also 
Emily Feng, 5 Takeaways from China’s Hong Kong National Security Law, NPR (July 1, 
2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/07/01/885900989/5-takeaways-from-chinas-hong-
kong-national-security-law [https://perma.cc/AWZ2-6BRT]. 
 5 Ryan Mcmorrow & Steven Lee Myers, Amway Made China a Billion-Dollar 
Market. Now it Faces a Crackdown., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/08/business/amway-china.html 
[https://perma.cc/8SFC-MDAA]. 
 6 See id. 
 7 See Epstein, supra, note 1, at 92. 
 8 See id. at 91 (internal footnote omitted). 
 9 See, e.g., id. at 92, 97–98 (“MLMs, including their founding members, have drawn 
scrutiny for decades from federal and state regulators who have . . . questioned their 
legitimacy altogether more akin to a pyramid scheme.”) (internal footnote omitted); see 
also Miao, supra note 3, at 394 (“[E]thical problems [in China] aroused by multilevel 
marketing . . . give a bad name to the direct selling as a whole in its market.”).  See 
generally JON M. TAYLOR, MULTI-LEVEL MARKETING UNMASKED: WHY MULTILEVEL 
MARKETING IS UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ch. 1–2 (Consumer Awareness Inst. ed., 2017) 
(ebook) (providing a more skeptical perspective of direct selling). 
 10 See, e.g., Mcmorrow & Myers, supra note 5; Yu Tian, On the Legal and Market 
Analysis of “Direct Selling” in China, 3 INT’L J. BUS. & MGMT. 86, 89–90 (2008). 
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Chinese media linked deaths of college graduates hoping to earn 
money after graduation to joining domestic pyramid schemes.11 
Due to a deeply engrained national relationship culture, known 
as guanxi in Mandarin,12 and unique economic conditions resulting 
in less consumer experience with privately-owned enterprises,13 
Chinese consumers prove more susceptible to being taken 
advantage of through schemes associated with direct selling.14  In 
2005, China acceded to the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) 
and passed the Regulations on Direct Selling Administration15 and 
Regulation on Prohibition of Pyramid Selling16 (collectively, 
“Regulations” or “2005 Regulations”) in an effort to combat 
corruption and the detrimental societal effects of direct selling 
enterprises.  These Regulations effectively limit market entry for 
foreign direct sales companies to single-level commission structures 
and impose stringent procedural requirements on direct marketing 
companies.17 
 
 11 He Huifeng, The Perils of Pyramid Schemes: A Dark Corner of China’s Economic 
Miracle, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Sept. 29, 2017), 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2108031/perils-pyramid-
schemes-dark-corner-chinas-economic [https://perma.cc/L6HX-BJ3P]; see also Han 
Rubo, Inverting the Pyramid, WORLD OF CHINESE (Sept. 21, 2019), 
https://www.theworldofchinese.com/2019/09/inverting-the-pyramid/ 
[https://perma.cc/GM8L-FFJ3]. 
 12 See infra Section IV-B (describing the interrelationship of guanxi and network 
marketing techniques). 
 13 Previously a planned economy, China is a more recently developed into a market 
economy with extraordinary growth. See, e.g., State Council Info. Off., China, China’s 
Efforts and Achievements in Promoting the Rule of Law, 7 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 513, 526–
29 (2008) (providing an overview of China’s efforts to strengthen economic legislation 
since its decision to adopt “opening-up policies in 1978” and “transition from a planned 
economy to a market economy”).  The official English translation from the Chinese State 
Council Information Office is available at 
http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7041733.htm 
[https://perma.cc/PW2V-8UY9]; see also Miao, supra note 3, at 396; Tian, supra note 10, 
at 90. 
 14 See Tian, supra note 10 at 89–90; Mcmorrow & Myers, supra note 5. 
 15 See Zhixiao Guanli Tiaoli (直销管理条例) [Regulations on Direct Selling 
Administration] (promulgated by the St. Council of the People’s Republic of China, Aug. 
10, 2005, effective Dec. 1, 2005) ST. COUNCIL GAZ., Sept. 3, 2005 (China). 
 16 Jinzhi Chuanxiao Tiaoli (禁止传销条例) [Regulation on Prohibition of Pyramid 
Selling] (promulgated by the St. Council of the People’s Republic of China, Aug. 10, 2005, 
effective Nov. 1, 2005) ST. COUNCIL GAZ., Sept. 3, 2005 (China). 
 17 See China – Commercial Guide: Direct Marketing, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., 
https://www.trade.gov/knowledge-product/china-direct-marketing 
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This Note explores the international implications of the 2005 
Regulations by assessing events both preceding and following their 
promulgation, including enforcement actions against direct sales 
enterprises seeking to obtain or maintain Chinese market entry.  
Specifically, this Note explores the asymmetric interrelations 
between the legal allegations contained in such enforcement actions 
and China’s unique socioeconomic conditions.  For instance, this 
Note addresses a significant misalignment between widespread 
global anti-corruption efforts—often prohibiting bribery and gift-
giving—and the practical necessity for foreign companies to 
participate in Chinese gift-giving practices to succeed in Chinese 
business culture. 
Part I provides a broad overview of this Note’s primary foci.  
Part II summarizes the legal frameworks and nomenclature of 
global direct selling, addressing the asymmetrical definitions of 
“direct selling” in the United States and China.  Part III outlines 
direct selling’s historical relationship with China: namely, China’s 
transition from a planned to a market economy and its 2001 
accession to the WTO.  Part IV explores direct selling’s heightened 
impact on Chinese consumers due to the nation’s unique economic 
and cultural conditions such as guanxi and a jarring national wealth 
gap.  Part V analyzes enforcement actions pertaining to non-
compliance with the Regulations and explores pertinent patterns 
therein.  Part VI briefly surveys the global direct selling industry’s 
modern economic status in China.  Part VII concludes, considering 
the potential impact of international uniform direct selling standards 
and recommending best practices for foreign direct selling 
enterprises doing business in China to resolve latent tensions 
between the Regulations and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(“FCPA”). 
II. International Direct Selling and the Implications of 
Industry Norms 
The direct sales industry encompasses MLMs, which employ 
multi-leveled commission structures, specifically upline-downline 
structures, in which downline member performance determines the 
uplines’ compensation.18  The MLM structure holds a fairly secure 
 
[https://perma.cc/6LHQ-LREU] (last updated Oct. 13, 2019). 
 18 Epstein, supra note 1, at 102–04. 
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position in international direct selling.19  However, MLMs are best 
known, perhaps notoriously, for word-of-mouth recruitment and/or 
sales techniques called “network marketing.”20  Overall, MLMs and 
their direct selling practices garner suspicion, often from consumer 
protection advocates, as to their legality, validity, and financial 
viability.21 
For instance, many network marketing22 tactics used in direct 
sales “can be extremely intense and sometimes misleading.”23  
“Concerns over fanatic, cult-like pressures preying upon potential 
recruits in order to persuade them to join or remain within the MLM 
membership ranks are quite common.”24  These concerns may 
increase due to hyperbolic economic claims made during 
recruitment or sales, such as boasting extreme, unrealistic (though 
undeniably desirable) income claims in recruitment efforts (i.e., 
growing the upline-downline).25  Additionally, high-profile 
incidents of corruption contribute to the widespread, negative 
perception of the MLM business structure.26 
 
 
 19 See id. at 91, 103–07 (explaining the differences between pyramid schemes, Ponzi 
schemes, and MLM structures of direct selling); Miao, supra note 3, at 394. 
 20 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 1, at 96–98.  For instance, network marketing 
techniques often employ questions like: Do you want to work from home and make money 
fast? Do you want to quit your job and be your own boss?  See id.; see also supra Section 
I (defining “network marketing”). 
 21 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 1, at 97 (explaining that state and federal regulators 
are also critical of MLMs); TAYLOR, supra note 9, at ch. 5; Multi-Level Marketing 
Businesses and Pyramid Schemes, supra note 2. 
 22 “Network marketing” is a form of mouth-to-mouth or grassroots marketing 
commonly used in direct selling.  See, e.g., Multi-Level Marketing Businesses and Pyramid 
Schemes, supra note 2; Epstein, supra note 1, at 96–97. 
 23 Epstein, supra note 1, at 97 (describing MLM recruitment techniques); see also 
Multi-Level Marketing Businesses and Pyramid Schemes, supra note 2.  MLMs have been 
known to make “outrageous claims[,]” and some have even employed “religious 
component[s] . . . .”  Epstein, supra note 1, at 98. 
 24 Epstein, supra note 1, at 97 (internal footnote omitted). 
 25 See id.; TAYLOR, supra note 9, at ch. 1–2, 2–12, 2–13 (“Prospects are typically 
lured into MLM[s] with exaggerated product and income claims.”); Business Guidance 
Concerning Multi-Level Marketing, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jan. 2018), 
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/business-guidance-concerning-
multi-level-marketing [https://perma.cc/SEC5-83CG]. 
 26 See Business Guidance Concerning Multi-Level Marketing, supra note 25; 
Epstein, supra note 1, at 92–93, 104–06; TAYLOR, supra note 9, at ch. 2–12, 2–13. 
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A. Positive Law Doctrine: Internationally Inconsistent 
Nomenclature in Direct Selling 
Besides the common conflation of MLMs and pyramid 
schemes,27 nomenclature in the international direct selling industry 
remains further disjointed, especially between the United States and 
China.28  Minimal legal research29 on MLMs, especially 
transnationally, also contributes to the industry’s lacking legal 
uniformity. 
1. Direct Selling in the United States: MLMs versus 
Pyramid Schemes 
In the United States, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) 
defines direct selling as “a blanket term that encompasses a variety 
of business forms premised on person-to-person selling in locations 
other than a retail establishment, such as social media platforms or 
the home of the salesperson or prospective customer.”30  Thus, U.S. 
direct selling, or direct sales, encompasses two distinct multi-level 
selling structures: (1) a legally legitimate, sales-based MLM31 and 
(2) an illegal, illegitimate, recruitment-based pyramid scheme that 
 
 27 See Business Guidance Concerning Multi-Level Marketing, supra note 25; Multi-
Level Marketing Businesses and Pyramid Schemes, supra note 2; Epstein, supra, note 1, 
at 92. 
 28 See Tian, supra note 10, at 88–90; Miao, supra note 3, at 395–96; see also TAYLOR, 
supra note 9, at ch. 2, pp.6–10 (advocating for “[a] more accurate, research-based 
definition of MLM that addresses structural flaws”). 
 29 Epstein, supra note 1, at 92. 
 30 Business Guidance Concerning Multi-Level Marketing, supra note 25.  In the 
United States, most “direct selling” definitions include MLMs as a sub-category of direct 
selling, but the individual definition of MLM varies.  See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 1, at 
95–104; TAYLOR, supra note 9, at ch. 2–12, 2–13 (offering his own, more skeptical, 
definition of MLM). 
 31 See Business Guidance Concerning Multi-Level Marketing, supra note 25.  The 
FTC defines MLM as a sub-category of direct selling:  
Multi-level marketing is one form of direct selling. Generally, a multi-level 
marketer (MLM) distributes products or services through a network of 
salespeople who . . . .may earn income depending on their own revenues and 
expenses. Typically, the company does not directly recruit its salesforce, but relies 
upon its existing salespeople to recruit additional salespeople, which creates 
multiple levels of “distributors” or “participants” organized in “downlines.” A 
participant’s “downline” is the network of his or her recruits, and recruits of those 
recruits, and so on. 
Id. 
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is financially reliant on recruitment or establishing an upline-
downline structure.32  In other words, the legality of MLMs in the 
United States depends upon the compensation scheme:33 An MLM 
must “pay compensation that is based on actual sales to real 
customers, rather than . . . mere wholesale purchases or other 
payments by its participants.”34  A company’s compensation 
scheme, not the mere presence of an upline-downline structure, 
bears most upon legitimacy under U.S. law.  If compensation 
derives primarily from actual sales to third-party customers, the 
MLM is likely legitimate.35 
However, while illegal pyramid schemes in the United States 
“can look remarkably like legitimate MLM business 
opportunities,”36 pyramid schemes pose the risk of significant 
financial loss.  The following warning signs are characteristic of 
pyramid schemes as defined by U.S. law: promoters making 
“extravagant promises about your earning potential”; emphasizing 
“recruiting new distributors for your sales network as the real way 
to make money”; and playing on your emotions or using high-
pressure sales tactics.37  Nonetheless, these warning signs may also 
be found in legal MLMs in the United States.38  Thus, even within 
the United States, distinguishing legitimate MLMs from illegal 
pyramid schemes proves to be a challenging and complex task.39  
This complexity only increases on an international scale. 
2. Direct Selling in China Under the 2005 Regulations 
China’s 2005 Regulations comprise the primary legal 
 
 32 See, e.g., id.; Epstein, supra note 1, at 100; Multi-Level Marketing Businesses and 
Pyramid Schemes, supra note 2. 
 33 See, e.g., Multi-Level Marketing Businesses and Pyramid Schemes, supra note 2. 
 34 Business Guidance Concerning Multi-Level Marketing, supra note 25 (emphasis 
added); see also Epstein, supra note 1, at 91, 103–04. 
 35 Business Guidance Concerning Multi-Level Marketing, supra note 25; Epstein, 
supra note 1, at 103; Multi-Level Marketing Businesses and Pyramid Schemes, supra note 
2. 
 36 Multi-Level Marketing Businesses and Pyramid Schemes, supra note 2. 
(“Eventually, most [pyramid scheme] distributors find that no matter how hard they work, 
they can’t sell enough inventory or recruit enough people to make money . . . .  In the end, 
most people run out of money, have to quit, and lose everything they invested.”). 
 37 Id. 
 38 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 1, at 95–100. 
 39 Id. at 123–24; see also TAYLOR, supra note 9, at ch. 11–38, 11–39. 
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instrument governing Chinese market entry for foreign direct selling 
enterprises and contradict U.S. direct selling law in several ways.40  
Most notably, the Regulations make no distinction between MLMs 
and pyramid schemes, and thus legalize only single-level direct 
selling subject to procedural market entry requirements, prohibiting 
all multi-level marketing structures.41 
Defining direct selling as “a type of business mode, in which 
direct selling companies recruit door-to-door salesmen to sell 
products directly to ultimate consumers . . . outside the companies’ 
fixed places of business[,]”42  the Regulations contradict U.S. law 
insofar as they exclude any businesses with multi-leveled structures 
from the market, regardless of their legality elsewhere.43  Using U.S. 
legal terms, both legal MLMs and illegal pyramid schemes are 
illegal under China’s Regulations, which only permit direct selling 
by single-level companies.44  Under China’s Regulations, any multi-
level, pyramid-like business structure, including the United States’ 
legal MLM,45 is illegal “pyramid selling,”46 regardless of legitimacy 
elsewhere.47  Thus, practically, the Regulations mandate significant 
structural change for legitimate U.S.-based MLMs. 
 
 40 See Zhixiao Guanli Tiaoli, supra note 15, art. 3; Jinzhi Chuanxiao Tiaoli, supra 
note 16, art. 2. 
 41 See Tian, supra note 10, at 86–87; Zhixiao Guanli Tiaoli, supra note 15; Jinzhi 
Chuanxiao Tiaoli, supra note 16. 
 42 Zhixiao Guanli Tiaoli, supra note 15, art. 3; see also id. art. 13; Jinzhi Chuanxiao 
Tiaoli, supra note 16, art. 2. 
 43 See id.; Tian, supra note 10, at 86–87; Miao, supra note 3, at 394–96; supra 
Section I. 
 44 Zhixiao Guanli Tiaoli, supra note 15 arts. 3 & 13; Jinzhi Chuanxiao Tiaoli, supra 
note 16, art. 2. 
 45 Miao, supra note 3, at 395; supra Section I. 
 46 See Zhixiao Guanli Tiaoli, supra note 15, art. 3; Jinzhi Chuanxiao Tiaoli, supra 
note 16, art. 2.  The 2005 Regulations define prohibited “pyramid selling” by reference to 
various notorious characteristics of MLMs and direct selling enterprises: 
The term “pyramid selling”…refers to such an act whereby an 
organizer or operator…disturbs the economic order and affects the 
social stability by recruiting persons, calculating and paying 
renumerations to recruiters on the basis of the number of persons a 
recruiter has directly or indirectly recruited or the sales performance, 
or asking the recruiters to pay a certain fee for obtaining the 
qualification for participation. 
Jinzhi Chuanxiao Tiaoli, supra note 16, art. 2. 
 47 See Jinzhi Chuanxiao Tiaoli, supra note 16, art. 2; Miao, supra note 3, at 395. 
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To further their underlying policy goal of adequate consumer 
protection, the Regulations require more than just structural change 
for market entry.48  For instance, they explicitly prohibit practices 
commonly associated with MLMs such as (1) basing commission 
upon recruitment instead of sales; (2) requiring a fee, direct or 
indirect, for membership; and (3) any pyramid-like internal 
structure, such as upline-downlines.49 
Lastly, the Regulations mandate procedural requirements for 
foreign direct sellers to enter the market.  Most notable is the 
requirement to obtain a direct selling license, which proves both 
tedious and demanding.50  Even when companies meet application 
requirements, Chinese governmental approval of foreign 
applications remains limited and arbitrary.51  In 2018, only one new 
direct sales company received a license, exhibiting a governmental 
effort to limit industry growth.52  Overall, China’s direct selling 
industry “remains closely watched and tightly regulated at both the 
central and local levels.”53 
 
 48 See, e.g., Zhixiao Guanli Tiaoli, supra note 15, art. 11.  See FAQ on Direct Sales 
in China, LEHMAN, LEE & XU, http://www.lehmanlaw.com/resource-centre/faqs/banking-
finance/faq-on-direct-sales-in-china.html [https://perma.cc/TY7D-BP7J] (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2019).  For instance, the Regulations require all direct sales companies to formally 
contract with sellers and give notice of employment rights.  Id.; see also Zhixiao Guanli 
Tiaoli, supra note 15, art. 16. 
 49 See Jinzhi Chuanxiao Tiaoli, supra note 16, arts. 2 & 7; Zhixiao Guanli Tiaoli, 
supra note 15, arts. 13 & 14. 
 50 See China – Commercial Guide: Direct Marketing, supra note 17; see also Zhixiao 
Guanli Tiaoli, supra note 15, art. 7–12 (enumerating the requirements to apply for and 
obtain a direct sales license in China).  Licensed products must fall within enumerated 
categories.  Id.; see also FAQ on Direct Sales in China, supra note 48. 
 51 China – Commercial Guide: Direct Marketing, supra note 17. 
 52 TMO GROUP, INDUSTRY REPORT: HEALTH & FOOD SUPPLEMENTS: CHINA MARKET 
– 2020, AT 20 (2020), available at https://www.tmogroup.asia/downloads/china-health-
supplements-industry-report/ [https://perma.cc/Y68P-5W8U]; see also Gao Feng, 
Spokesperson, Ministry of Com. of China (MOFCOM), Regular Press Conference of the 
Ministry of Commerce (Feb. 14, 2019) (transcript available at 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/press/201902/20190202835091.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/8JEN-ALCV]) (answering a question as to likelihood of direct sales 
license issuance for 2019); infra Sections IV & V-B. 
 53 China – Commercial Guide: Direct Marketing, supra note 17; see also Mark 
Schaub & David Hong, China Crackdown – How Does it Impact International MLMs?, 
CHINA L. INSIGHT (Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.chinalawinsight.com/2017/08/ 
articles/compliance/china-crackdown-how-does-it-impact-international-mlms/ 
[https://perma.cc/M9VZ-2SUY]; Mark Schaub, Atticus Zhao & David Hong, A Castle 
Built on Sand: Challenges and Opportunities for Network Marketing in China, CHINA L. 
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Non-compliance with the Regulations may result in civil and/or 
criminal liability under Chinese law, bearing significant 
consequences in either case.  If Chinese governmental authorities 
determine that direct selling conduct constitutes an illegal pyramid 
scheme under the Regulations, such violation may constitute “a 
criminal offense” under Chinese law.54  Even if conduct does not 
comprise criminalized pyramid selling, non-compliance with the 
Regulations may subject direct selling companies to significant 
administrative sanctions.55  Therefore, to avoid any liability under 
the Regulations and/or Chinese criminal law, direct selling 
companies, international and domestic alike, must comply with the 
single-level structural mandate and licensure requirements. 
 
INSIGHT (June 21, 2017), https://www.chinalawinsight.com/2017/06/ 
articles/corporate-ma/a-castle-built-on-sand-challenges-and-opportunities-for-network-
marketing-in-china/ [https://perma.cc/6FRJ-M5G4] (discussing potential consequences 
for non-compliance with the Regulations).  See generally Peter J. Wang, Yizhe Zhang, & 
Qiang Xue, Looking Ahead: The Integration of Chinese Anti-Monopoly Enforcement 
Authorities, ANTITRUST SOURCE (Aug. 2018), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/2018-
2019/atsource-august2018/aug18_wang_8_16f.pdf [https://perma.cc/8P4N-26NK] 
(recounting that, as of 2018, China’s antitrust reform gave enforcement power for the 
Regulations to a new state agency: the State Administration for Market Regulation). 
 54 David Hong & Mark Schaub, China 2019: Still Open for Network Marketing 
Businesses, MLM.COM (Jan. 14, 2019), https://mlm.com/china-2019-still-open-network-
marketing-businesses/ [https://perma.cc/7N5N-VJ6S].  “[I]nternational MLM companies 
which operate in China must change their compensation model for that specific market[,]”, 
for if “such companies continue operating the same compensation model of multiple levels 
of commission within the borders of China as they do in their home market, they can be 
hit with criminal liability under Chinese law.”  Id.; see also Jinzhi Chuanxiao Tiaoli, supra 
note 16, arts. 13, 24, 28-29.   
 55 For instance, potential repercussions for companies non-compliant with the 
Regulations may include being “branded as illegal pyramid schemes [which] will face 
official [criminal] investigation . . . often result[ing] in the arrest of person-in-charge of 
affiliates within China and company executives who travel to China[,]” and/or “the non-
compliant company will quickly find out how fragile its business in China is – the Chinese 
authorities can quickly move to shut down the company’s website and all social media 
channels – [and] given the importance of social media and the internet in most network 
marketing companies this effectively shut[s] down a company’s operations overnight.”  
See Schaub & Hong, supra note 53. 
88 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLVI 
III. Chinese Governmental Intent Underlying the 2005 
Regulations: Consumer Protection, Governmental Market 
Control, and China’s WTO Accession 
In the modern socio-political context,56 the global narrative 
underlying the Regulations characterizes them as a condition for 
China’s 2001 accession to the WTO.57  On the whole, China’s 
unique economic conditions and contentious history with direct 
selling engender a distrust of the industry, both domestically and 
internationally. 
A. China’s Economic Reform, 1990s MLM Movement, and 
Subsequent 1998 Blanket Ban on Direct Selling 
The normative underpinnings of China’s 2005 Regulations go 
as far back as 1978, when China began major economic reforms. 
The reforms carried significant socioeconomic implications as 
China transitioned from a planned economy, associated with its 
socialist era, to a modern market economy.58   
Within China, economic reform brought rapid industrialization, 
urbanization,59 and an “influx of transnational culture, capital, and 
people” which must be understood “from a cultural and economic 
framework more complex than the simple adoption of Euro-
 
 56 The extent of the political and economic implications of China’s WTO accession 
extend beyond this Note’s scope. See, e.g., How Influential is China in the World Trade 
Organization?, CHINAPOWER, https://chinapower.csis.org/china-world-trade-
organization-wto/ [https://perma.cc/69AV-GJKL], (last updated June 18, 2020). 
 57 See China and the WTO, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/2MBT-G27W] (last visited June 13, 2020) (noting that China’s 
accession occurred on Dec. 11, 2001); Press Release, WTO, WTO Ministerial Conference 
Approves China’s Accession (Nov. 10, 2001), available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr252_e.htm [https://perma.cc/PTP9-
RGBR]. 
 58 See, e.g., State Council Info. Off., China, supra note 13, at 526–29; CHINA URBAN: 
ETHNOGRAPHIES OF CONTEMPORARY CULTURE 2 (Nancy N. Chen, Constance D. Clark, 
Suzanne Z. Gottschang & Lyn Jeffery eds., 2001) [hereinafter CHINA URBAN]; U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, 2018 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S WTO COMPLIANCE 19-20 
(2019), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2018-USTR-Report-to-Congress-on-
China%27s-WTO-Compliance.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ARU-A3D2] (discussing the 
benefits China gained by joining the WTO). 
 59 The extent of socioeconomic implications stemming from China’s economic 
reform and subsequent urbanization goes beyond this Note’s scope. For a broad overview 
of its implications and for thirteen ethnographies examining “the urban” and urbanization 
processes in 1990s China, see generally CHINA URBAN, supra note 58. 
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American neo-liberal capitalism.”60  The Chinese state and the 
Chinese market “are sometimes mutually constitutive, . . . [i]n other 
instances, these categories are more ambiguous, more explicitly 
oppositional, and less state initiated.”61  This framework may 
account for China’s often contradictory values: socialist-era 
underpinnings inextricably tied to modern market economy values 
and reality.62 
On the whole, governmental motivation behind the 2005 
Regulations may be understood best by looking first to China’s 
underlying motivations.  These include, first, China’s 1998 direct 
selling ban, and second, its joining the WTO in 2001, conceding to 
the Regulations in return for an ultimately modern global economic 
reign. 
1. China’s 1990s MLM Movement and Subsequent 
Direct Selling Blanket Ban 
Because of China’s economic reform and delayed opening of its 
economy, direct selling arrived in China later than nations like 
America, Taiwan, and Japan.63  Yet direct selling’s profitability 
proved immediately apparent.  By 1997, fewer than twenty years 
after the nation’s first encounter with direct selling, China had 2,300 
direct selling firms, employing up to 20 million citizens, and 
boasted a $2 billion USD sales volume.64  Further, by 1997, most 
 
 60 CHINA URBAN, supra note 58, at 2. 
 61 Id. at 10, 10–12 (providing an overview of these often contradictory values and/or 
motivations).  “While much has been written about the disempowerment of the nation-
state in the face of increasingly flexible and mobile capital, in China we see a process of 
negotiation between the state and new kinds of economic actors.”  Id. at 10.  “The 
equivocal and contradictory position of the state, where officials increasingly find 
themselves representing the interests of capital, is ironic . . . given . . . the nature of 
relations between labor and capital . . . [as a] founding moral narrative[] of the entire 
socialist era.”  Id. at 11. 
 62 See id. at 12. 
 63 See Miao, supra note 3, at 394–96, 398 (noting that foreign direct selling firms 
entered China in the early 1980s–90s); see also State Council Info. Off., China, supra note 
13, at 515, 517, 522, 526-29 (tracing the economic development that led to the modern 
entrance of direct selling firms into China’s markets); Lyn Jeffery, Placing Practices: 
Transnational Network Marketing in Mainland China, in CHINA URBAN: ETHNOGRAPHIES 
OF CONTEMPORARY CULTURE 23, 23–24, 28 (Nancy N. Chen; Constance D. Clark; Suzanne 
Z. Gottschang; Lyn Jeffery eds., 2001). 
 64 See Miao, supra note 3, at 394–95; Jeffery, supra note 63, at 23–24.  “From 1990 
to its official ban in 1998, the Chinese [MLM] movement offered millions of Chinese the 
opportunity to . . . partially replace or subvert conventional social geographies . . . .  By 
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urban Chinese citizens had at least heard of MLMs (chuanxiao),65 
and “many had friends or family who had tried it if they had not 
done so themselves.”66   However, in 1998, China issued a blanket 
ban on direct selling67 in the name of consumer protection and social 
stability.68  Governmental interest underlying China’s 1998 blanket 
ban appears ambiguous, oscillating between genuine concern for 
consumer protection and desire for state control over a rapidly-
growing, unexplored industry in China’s newfound market 
economy.69 
Chinese officials insisted the 1998 ban was intended to 
primarily prevent abuse by domestic Chinese pyramid schemes 
taking advantage of China’s recently-liberalized laws against 
private business and harming consumers, denying any exclusionary 
targeting of foreign enterprises.70  Acknowledging China’s genuine 
need to safeguard consumers from deceptive domestic pyramid 
schemes,71 legitimate U.S. direct selling firms doing business in 
China (e.g., Amway, Avon, and Mary Kay)72  nevertheless felt that 
the ban was overreaching.73  This contention may prove more 
 
1997, the multilevel marketing [] industry, introduced to China by American, Taiwanese, 
and Japanese companies, had sold an estimated U.S. $7 billion . . . through networks with 
some 10 million participants.”  Id. 
 65 Jeffery, supra note 63, at 23; see also Tian, supra note 10, at 88–90 (providing an 
overview of the translation of this term and potential causes for confusion). 
 66 Jeffery, supra note 63, at 41 n.5. 
 67 Miao, supra note 3, at 394–95; Jeffery, supra note 63, at 24, 39–40. 
 68 Miao, supra note 3, at 395. 
 69 See John Pomfret, China Bans Direct Marketing to Attack Scams, WASH. POST 
(Apr. 28, 1998), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1998/04/28/china-
bans-direct-marketing-to-attack-scams/b1178e4a-02cb-49d2-81d8-93b0fffb6b0c/ 
[https://perma.cc/77K5-MAET]. 
 70 See, e.g., id.; see also Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, Avon’s FCPA Investigation in 
China and Beyond, 10 FCPA UPDATE 7, 7-8 (2011); Jeffery, supra note 63, at 28.  
Domestic Chinese direct selling scams “mimic American direct marketing operations in 
that participants buy products to sell to other consumers[. H]owever, in the scams, the 
products are often worthless.”  Pomfret, supra note 69. 
 71 See Pomfret, supra note 69. 
 72 The descriptor “legitimate” conveys here that the named enterprises were 
considered legal MLMs under U.S. law and, in the 1990s, conducting business in China 
legally. See Pomfret, supra note 69; Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, News from the BRICs: 
China: Avon Suspends Four Executives in Anti-Bribery Investigation, 1 FCPA UPDATE 5, 
5-6 (2010) (reporting that Avon was the first direct selling company to enter China, legally 
conducting business until its executives faced bribery charges in 2010.). 
 73 See Pomfret, supra note 69. 
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reasonable considering that direct selling within networks of 
personal connections makes an industry less susceptible to 
governmental penetration.74  This is particularly relevant to 1990s 
China, which was then transitioning from a state-controlled market 
with Chinese citizens becoming individual market participants with 
subjective consumer interests and market practices different from 
the state’s.75 
China’s purported rationale for the 1998 ban, primarily 
corruption by domestic pyramid schemes, is difficult to reconcile 
with the reality that the ban practically and normatively manifested 
a desire to maintain state market control by limiting foreign market 
influence and exposure in direct selling.76  The multi-faceted 
governmental intent underlying China’s 1998 blanket ban translates 
almost directly to the 2005 Regulations. Both purport to protect 
consumers from immediate potential harm from direct selling, both 
domestic and international, while still maintaining a degree of state 
control over consumer lifestyles and market practices. 
B. The 2005 Regulations: A Condition for China’s WTO 
Accession 
The 2005 Regulations constitute one of multiple concessions 
made for China’s 2001 WTO accession,77 which endowed China 
with “access to new trading partners[,] . . . better rates with current 
ones, rais[ed] prospects for improved living standards domestically 
and . . . a seat at the table in a globalizing” international economy.78  
Despite China lifting the 1998 blanket ban and re-opening its 
 
 74 See Jeffery, supra note 63, at 39–40; see also Michele A. Wong, China’s Direct 
Marketing Ban: A Case Study of China’s Response to Capital-Based Social Networks, 11 
WASH. INT’L L.J. 257, 257 (2002) (discussing China’s 1998 blanket ban on direct selling 
and the potential of direct selling organizations as “self-motivated political force[s]”). 
 75 See Jeffery, supra note 63, at 39–40; see also Wong, supra note 74, at 272. 
 76 See Jeffery, supra note 63, at 39-40; see also Wong, supra note 74, at 260, 276–
77. 
 77 See generally, China’s Long March to WTO Entry, CNN.COM (Dec. 10, 2001), 
https://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/east/09/18/china.wto.timeline/ 
[https://perma.cc/LC4X-8YUL] (providing a streamlined overview of China’s lengthy, 
controversial WTO accession). 
 78 What Happened When China Joined the WTO?, WORLD101, 
https://world101.cfr.org/global-era-issues/trade/what-happened-when-china-joined-wto 
[https://perma.cc/UNU8-GMPT] (last visited June 14, 2020); see also Miao, supra, note 
3, at 395; Tian, supra note 10, at 86; State Council Info. Off., China, supra note 13, at 529, 
543. 
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economy in part to certain foreign enterprises, the Regulations 
remain an issue today for U.S.-China trade relations79 and 
international direct selling.80 
IV. Direct Selling’s Unique Socioeconomic and Cultural 
Impact on China 
Economic and cultural factors make Chinese consumers 
particularly susceptible to direct sales techniques.  This Section 
addresses two such factors.  First, it analyzes China’s extreme 
income gap and how this gap may leave already marginalized sub-
groups most vulnerable to get-rich-quick techniques.  Second, it 
addresses China’s deeply-engrained guanxi culture, assessing 
heightened consumer reactivity to network marketing techniques 
employed in direct sales. 
A. China’s Ever-Present Wealth Gap and Direct Selling’s 
Marginalized Appeal 
In addition to the aforementioned factors lending to China’s 
distrust of direct selling,81 China today suffers from a jarring wealth 
gap.  Chinese citizens on the lower end of the wealth gap and many 
 
 79 Modern U.S.-China trade relations and disputes extend beyond this Note’s scope. 
For more information, see generally U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 58; Philip 
Levy, Was Letting China into the WTO a Mistake?, FOREIGN AFF. (Apr. 2, 2018), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-04-02/was-letting-china-wto-mistake 
[https://perma.cc/C27Z-37HC]; U.S. CHAMBER OF COM. & AM. CHAMBER OF COM. IN 
CHINA, PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S.-CHINA TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/tradereport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JX2A-LJJG]; Amanda Lee, China Refuses to Give Up ‘Developing 
Country’ Status at WTO Despite US Demands, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Apr. 6, 2019), 
https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3004873/china-refuses-give-
developing-country-status-wto-despite-us [https://perma.cc/7JLX-JUKX]; Antara Ghosal 
Singh, What Does China Want from WTO Reforms?, DIPLOMAT (May 21, 2019), 
https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/what-does-china-want-from-wto-reforms/ 
[https://perma.cc/4FZX-QUET]; Silvia Amaro, ‘A Reform-or-Die Moment’: Why World 
Powers Want to Change the WTO, CNBC (Feb. 7, 2020), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/07/world-powers-us-eu-china-are-grappling-to-update-
the-wto.html [https://perma.cc/SUC6-5FC7]. 
 80 See, e.g., U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, Appendix to 2019 REPORT TO CONGRESS 
ON CHINA’S WTO COMPLIANCE A-1, A-95 (2020), 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2019_Report_on_China’s_WTO_Compliance.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4KKF-HH8R]; U.S. CHAMBER OF COM. & AM. CHAMBER OF COM. IN 
CHINA, supra note 79. 
 81 See supra Section III (addressing these economic factors, both historically and 
contextually). 
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others in financially precarious situations are more often victims of 
the predatory practices often associated with direct selling.82 
As of 2018, China’s income gap was larger than the United 
States’.83  This gap must be assessed contextually, accounting for 
China’s rapid and globally phenomenal $11 trillion economic 
growth which, as of 2018, was still growing “by close to 7 per cent 
a year, [with] newly minted billionaires regularly mak[ing] 
headlines[.]”84  Thus, Chinese citizens from lower income levels, 
heretofore excluded from China’s highly publicized economic 
growth and success, prove particularly susceptible to predatory get-
rich-quick techniques.85  Reasons for this include these individuals’ 
financial status and China’s unique socioeconomic conditions, 
which make such techniques appear feasible and leave 
disadvantaged groups like agricultural workers and college 
graduates more vulnerable to direct sales practices.86 
Rural and agricultural workers,87 who almost always fall on the 
low end of China’s wealth gap,88 are one generalized example of 
Chinese citizens particularly vulnerable to predatory techniques in 
direct selling.  China’s economic disparities are particularly 
apparent “between urban and rural areas”89 and this “urban-rural 
divide”90  remains “a key driver behind [China’s] rising income 
 
 82 See, e.g., Huifeng, supra note 11; Stone Shi, The Great Divide Between China’s 
Rich and Poor, ZHONGGUO INST. (Nov. 27, 2018), https://zhongguoinstitute.org/the-great-
divide-between-chinas-rich-and-poor/ [https://perma.cc/57FR-RQRF] (“[A]s far as 
income distribution goes, China is more unequal than some of the world’s poorest 
nations[.]”).  Its wealth gap has been called “the great urban-rural divide.”  Id. 
 83 Shi, supra note 82. 
 84 Huifeng, supra note 11. 
 85 See, e.g., id. (“[M]any of those left behind by the economic boom – fresh university 
graduates struggling to find a proper job, workers laid off from state factories where they 
toiled for decades, and migrant labourers – also yearn to get rich quick.”). 
 86 See id.  In some of China’s most egregious instances of pyramid scheme 
corruption, participants attempting to escape were victims of physical beatings to coerce 
them to stay. Even those who managed to escape sometimes remain brainwashed or 
mentally affected by trauma. See, e.g., Rubo, supra note 11; Huifeng, supra note 11. 
 87 See Huifeng, supra note 11; see also infra Section III and accompanying notes. 
 88 See Huifeng, supra note 11; Shi, supra note 82.  As of 2017, accelerated economic 
growth had transformed China “in just a generation from an egalitarian society into a 
country with one of the world’s largest wealth gaps[,]” a gap still increasing today.  
Huifeng, supra note 11. 
 89 Shi, supra note 82. 
 90 Id. 
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inequality.”91  As a result, agrarian workers frequently fall victim to 
get-rich-quick fantasies.  Likewise, recent college graduates, who 
may be in financially dubious situations, are another demographic 
easily captivated by get-rich-quick techniques.92  On the whole, job-
searching college graduates from local higher education institutions 
(versus “prestigious key universities”) experience significant 
difficulty obtaining post-graduate employment, which heightens 
susceptibility to predatory practices associated with the direct 
selling industry.93 
In 2017, Chinese social unrest about the industry94 culminated 
in a “three-month national campaign to crackdown on illegal 
 
 91 Id. 
 92 See Rubo, supra note 11; Huifeng, supra note 11. 
 93 See Rubo, supra note 11; Huifeng, supra note 11; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OP. AND 
DEV. (OECD), CHINA IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 554-56 (2005) 
(ebook).  As of 2005, “an average of 20% of [] university graduates and 50% of [] graduates 
from non-degree colleges cannot find jobs” in China despite China’s overall shortage in 
university graduates and continued need for a skilled workforce.  OECD, supra note 95, 
at 555 (noting that, between 2001 and 2004, “[t]he number of higher education graduates 
[in China] seeking employment increased from 1.15 million . . . to 2.80 million . . . , more 
than doubling in just three years”).  “[I]t is not only the graduates living in the 
economically depressed areas who have [employment] difficulties….About 10% of the 
university graduates in Shanghai, one of the most prosperous coastal cities, are 
unemployed in the first 12 months after graduation.”  Id.; see also id. at 554-55 (noting “a 
growing problem of the labour market structure and the imbalance of demand and supply 
of qualified human resources” in China, as of 2005).  Relatedly, the Chinese direct selling 
industry has been described as “provid[ing] [] low-threshold and flexible opportunities of 
starting a business and employment for a large number of people who are short of 
professional skills with lower education degree.”  Shen Danyang, News Spokesman,  
Ministry of Com. of China (MOFCOM), Press Conference of the Ministry of Commerce 
(Nov. 4, 2015) (transcript available at 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/counselorsoffice/westernasiaandafricar
eport/201511/20151101165802.shtml [https://perma.cc/U45X-697S]) (answering the 
eighth question posed regarding what role the 2005 Regulations played in “the 
development of [China’s] direct selling industry”). 
 94 See, e.g., China to Step Up Crackdown on Pyramid Schemes, XINHUANET (Apr. 
10, 2018), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-04/10/c_137100941.htm 
[https://perma.cc/ZE5N-BK7F].  As recently as 2019, China has demonstrated hostility 
towards foreign direct sales companies.  See, e.g., Li Lei, 91 Direct-Sellers Ordered to 
Review their Management and Marketing Practices, CHINA DAILY.COM (Jan. 30, 2019), 
http://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201901/30/WS5c50f518a3106c65c34e7360.html 
[https://perma.cc/2HG9-HEV9]; China Suspends Registration and Approvals of Direct 
Selling, XINHUANET (Feb. 14, 2019), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-
02/14/c_137821994.htm [https://perma.cc/XAW6-7F3W]. 
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pyramid schemes in China[.]”95  This crackdown can largely be 
attributed to the deaths of recent college graduates in “suspicious 
pyramid scheme related circumstances”96 and public uprisings in 
July 2017 against a corrupt Chinese Ponzi scheme.97  The 2017 
public protests focused on the “cult-like activities”98 of unlawful 
pyramid schemes, escalating existing outrage in the media about the 
college graduates’ deaths.99 
China’s economic conditions, including its extreme income gap, 
engender the high likelihood of sub-groups like agrarian workers 
and college graduates falling for unlawful, predatory direct selling 
practices.  China’s uniquely contentious, personal relationship with 
direct selling may offer some justification for the stringent 
consumer protection policies latent in the 2005 Regulations. 
B. Guanxi: The Unique Susceptibility of Chinese Consumers 
to Network Marketing 
China’s national relationship culture, guanxi,100 makes Chinese 
 
 95 Schaub & Hong, supra note 53. 
 96 Id.; see also Huifeng, supra note 11; Rubo, supra note 11 (revealing the extreme 
corruption of certain Chinese pyramid schemes). One of the first cases involving the death 
of a college graduate was twenty-three-year-old Li Wenxing, whose body “was found in a 
pond on the outskirts of Tianjin on July 14, two months after . . . arriv[ing] in the city” as 
a recent college graduate.  Huifeng, supra note 11. 
 97 See Schaub & Hong, supra note 53.  For a general overview of the legal 
distinctions between Ponzi schemes, MLMs, and pyramid schemes, see Epstein, supra 
note 1, at 106–09. 
 98 See Schaub & Hong, supra note 53. 
 99 See id. 
 100 Guanxi literally means “personal connections, relationship or social networks” and 
“implies trust and mutual obligations between parties, and [] operates on personal, familial, 
social, business and political levels[:] Having good, bad or no guanxi impacts one’s 
influence and ability to get things done.”  Michael C. Wenderoth, How a Better 
Understanding of Guanxi Can Improve Your Business in China, FORBES (May 16, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelcwenderoth/2018/05/16/how-a-better-
understanding-of-guanxi-can-improve-your-business-in-china/#5c7b8cde5d85 
[https://perma.cc/3KLM-5F98].  Guanxi requires mutual trust and “friendship or familial 
feelings[,]” paying homage to “China’s implicit “traditional rule of virtue[.]”  Mary Szto, 
Chinese Gift-Giving, Anti-Corruption Law, and the Rule of Law and Virtue, 39 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 591, 593, 610 (2016) (“China’s traditional rule of virtue is a tenet of 
Confucianism that a government’s promotion of virtue is superior to governance by legal 
measures. Virtue is cultivated through ritual [e.g., gift-giving].”). 
  Guanxi “is widely acknowledged as essential for successful business dealings in 
China.”  Szto, supra, at 593; see also Wenderoth, supra (noting that a study performed on 
700 Chinese entrepreneurs about the impact of social networks on business success 
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consumers uniquely susceptible to network marketing,101 bolstering 
direct selling’s influence in China.  Guanxi’s interrelation with the 
direct selling industry likely furthers the governmental desire to 
limit the industry’s presence (especially via foreign influence) to 
ensure a high degree of state-market involvement and oversight.102 
Essential to direct selling’s success in China in the 1990s, 
guanxi complements the essence of direct selling: the proliferation 
of personal relationships to increase sales volume.103  Despite being 
“a key reason why network marketing is such big business in 
China[,]”104 some scholars nonetheless advocate against excessive 
profiting in China via guanxi and network marketing, warning of 
 
suggested “higher trust and being strategically connected (having guanxi, or broker 
networks) was correlated to business success”).  In Chinese business, “effective guanxi 
requires ganqing and renqing, or friendship or familial feelings[,]” Szto, supra at 593, and 
“foster[s] familial ties among business partners that lead to trust[,]” id. at 611.  Renqing 
“may be translated as human warmth, favor, or sympathy” and ganqing “may be translated 
as affection” or “a present feeling based on past treatment; it creates guanxi, or an 
obligation for the future.”  Id. at 611, 620 (“Having guanxi means having reliable people 
who can help when one is in need.”). 
  Gift-giving is argued as essential for cultivating guanxi, both traditionally and in 
modern Chinese business.  Id. at 593, 620-26; but see Wenderoth, supra (pointing out “the 
downsides of guanxi” such as the common association “with corruption” and the potential 
to “lead to dangerous reciprocal obligations and collective blindness”).  Gift-giving 
cultivates guanxi by “creat[ing] future obligations[.]”  Szto, supra, at 620.  A gift’s value 
is “directly tied to ganqing: obligation, strength of feeling, and dependability.”  Id.  
Likewise, “the lapse of time between a gift and its return gift[] heighten[s] the moral stance 
of the gift.”  Id. (noting that “giving a return gift of equal value within a day or two was 
considered an insult”).  Simultaneously, “[g]iving a gift demonstrates one’s economic 
power[.]”  Id. (internal quotations and footnote omitted); see also Id. at 592, 620–21 
(expanding upon the concept of mianzi). 
  To keep up with China’s recent economic growth, “guanxi must be expressed 
through gifts of increased value.”  Id.  There remains a distinction between virtuous gift-
giving and bribery in the guanxi system: “whether the payment is to develop a relationship 
or to achieve an immediate gain.”  Id. at 621 (emphasizing that “immediate gain” resulting 
from gift-giving indicates bribery).  In sum, “[g]uanxi is about increasing resources 
through repeated reciprocal acts of favor and ganqing and renqing, or familial affection.”  
Id. at 626. 
 101 See supra Section II (providing a brief summary of network marketing strategies 
and normative implications). 
 102 See, e.g., supra Section III-A. See generally Jeffery, supra note 63 (proposing that 
China’s 1998 blanket ban on direct selling was tied to, at least in part, a governmental 
desire to maintain market and consumer control). 
 103 See Jeffery, supra note 63. 
 104 Hong & Schaub, supra note 53. 
2020 REINTRODUCING INTERNATIONAL DIRECT SALES COMPANIES 97 
potential “damage [to] the foundation of Chinese society[.]”105  Both 
guanxi and network marketing depend upon “interpersonal 
relationships.”106  However, traditional guanxi departs from U.S. 
networking, especially in business relations.107 
As opposed to the contractual style of U.S. business, which 
depends upon “strong codified laws[,]”108 Chinese business success 
depends upon effective guanxi, relying upon personal networking 
or trust109 and requiring mutual trust, or similar “friendship or 
familial feelings.”110  These contrary cultural dispositions heighten 
susceptibility of Chinese consumers to transnational network 
marketing because it “sells interpersonal relationships[,]”111 
emphasizing relational opportunities.112  “Word-of-mouth 
[network] marketing has a much higher conversion rate [in China] 
than traditional forms of marketing because of the importance 
which the Chinese place upon trusting their close friends and 
family.  This nurturing of relationships is what drives the prevalence 
of network marketing businesses in China.”113 
Guanxi remains essential for successful business in China 
today,114 and, since China’s economic transition from planned to 
 
 105 Miao, supra note 3, at 397 (reasoning that “relationship management is a product 
of social culture”). 
 106 Id. 
 107 See Wenderoth, supra note 100; Miao, supra note 3, at 397; State Council Info. 
Off., China, supra note 13, at 514, 517. 
 108 See Wenderoth, supra note 100. 
 109 See id. (identifying “networks of trust and mutual obligations” as important to 
Chinese business success); Miao, supra note 3, at 397 (explaining that China’s economy 
remains highly “dependen[t] on social stability”); State Council Info. Off., China, supra 
note 13, at 514, 517; see also Zhu Wenquian, Culture as a Pillar of the Nation’s Economy, 
CHINADAILY ASIA (Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.chinadailyasia.com/business/2016-
04/18/content_15417941.html [https://perma.cc/BWT3-G9NP]. 
 110 Szto, supra note 100, at 593. 
 111 Miao, supra note 3, at 397. 
 112 See id.; Wenderoth, supra note 100. 
 113 Hong & Shaub, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..  “Network[] 
marketing is alive and thriving in China. This can be seen in the dynamic and innovative 
nature of the business in China.  Wildly successful domestic and international networking 
marketing companies have tapped into China’s relationship culture, known in China as 
‘guanxi’.”  Yet “network marketing is not static in China – the market is still growing and 
innovative programs are constantly popping up . . . .  [Thus,] competitive companies need 
to innovate, whether in business model, compensation or reward mechanisms. 
Differentiation is key.”  Id. 
 114 Szto, supra note 100, at 625–26. 
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market economy, has expanded beyond the traditional, familial 
setting into capitalized business practices115 via gift-giving.116  In 
“urban [Chinese] business[,]”117 “gift-giving among business 
associates and government officials”118 is practically required for 
effective, successful business in China.119  Further, China’s modern 
economic conditions require amplification of traditional guanxi 
gift-giving, which solidifies gifts in the Chinese business context as 
emblems of  “privilege and status.”120  Since a gift’s value is directly 
related to the extent of its returned obligation, effective guanxi and 
business in the modern Chinese economy require giving and 
receiving “gifts of increased value[,]”121 thereby reinforcing gifts as 
longstanding symbolizations of one’s status,122 and also 
emphasizing gift-giving as necessary for successful Chinese 
business ventures.123  Thus, guanxi gift-giving constitutes a practical 
business requirement for success in China’s urban business 
sector.124  This practical economic necessity exacerbates the 
economic plight of citizens at the lower end of the Chinese national 
wealth gap,125 as China’s economic success via exclusionary, 
capitalistic guanxi gift-giving practices elude them.126 
 
 115 See Szto, supra note 100, at 593, 620, 626; Wenderoth, supra note 100.  It has 
been suggested that one should assess one’s business guanxi in terms of three levels—
personal, business, and sector or governmental—expanding guanxi beyond initial, 
personalized roots.  Wenderoth, supra note 100. 
 116 Szto, supra note 100, at 611. 
 117 Id. at 620. 
 118 Id. at 626. 
 119 See id. 
 120 Id. at 611; see also Id. at 620-21.  Emphasizing the importance of virtuous gift-
giving when doing business in China, “wise and faithful giving” is suggested for adhering 
to traditional guanxi, such as allowing time to pass before returning the gift in order to 
“heighten[] the moral stance of the gift” and/or giving a “return gift” at least equivalent in 
value to the original gift. Id. at 620–21 (internal footnote omitted). 
 121 This correlation has been pointed out as directly related to Chinese consumers’ 
status as “the largest number of luxury goods consumers in the world.”  Id. at 620, 626 (“It 
is also not an accident that today Chinese are the number one consumers of luxury goods 
in the world; and that officials may receive up to half of these goods.”). 
 122 Szto, supra note 100, at 610. 
 123 See id. at 611, 620–21, 625. 
 124 See id. at 593, 620, 625. 
 125 See supra Section IV-A (discussing the pertinence and extremity of China’s wealth 
gap). 
 126 See id.; Szto, supra note 100, at 611, 620–21, 625 (discussing the capitalistic 
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Deeply-engrained in the national psyche, guanxi increases the 
direct selling industry’s attraction to the already-desirable Chinese 
market by heightening consumer reactivity to network marketing.127  
In addition to China’s unique economic conditions,128 cultural 
susceptibility to network marketing contributes further to the need 
for consumer protection policies as exhibited in the Regulations.129 
V. Non-Compliance with the Regulations: U.S. Enforcement 
Standards and Patterns under the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (“FCPA”) for Chinese Subsidiary Conduct  
Indirectly, China’s 2005 Regulations often manifest in the 
United States regulatory system, either in actions brought under the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA” or “the Act”)130 by the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), 
and/or by the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”).  In these 
actions, U.S.-based direct sales companies allegedly violate (1) the 
Act’s anti-bribery provisions,131 and/or (2) the Act’s accounting 
provisions,132 including (a) the “books and records provision”133 and 
(b) “internal controls provision[.]”134  When intertwined with 
 
development of guanxi gift-giving in the Chinese business context). 
 127 See Miao, supra note 3, at 396; see also Schaub et al., supra note 53. 
 128 See supra Sections III-A & IV-A. 
 129 See Miao, supra note 3, at 397; see also Jeffery, supra note 63, at 37–40. 
 130 See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et 
seq. (“FCPA” or “the Act”). 
 131 See id. § 78dd-1 (prohibiting and sanctioning the bribery of foreign officials).  The 
anti-bribery provisions “can apply to conduct both inside and outside the United States.”  
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIM. DIV. & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO 
THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 10 (2012), 
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-resource-guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/YVQ8-
LPLZ] [hereinafter RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE FCPA] (emphasis added). 
 132 See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2)(A), (b)(2)(B) (containing the accounting 
provisions of the FCPA). 
 133 The “‘books and records provision” of 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) mandates that 
international direct sales companies “make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, 
in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the [company’s] transactions and 
dispositions of [its] assets.”  RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE FCPA, supra note 131, at 39 (internal 
footnote omitted).  See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (containing the statutory text 
of the books and records provision). 
 134 RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE FCPA, supra note 131, at 38 (“[U]nder the ‘internal 
controls’ provision” [15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B)], international direct sales companies 
‘must devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to assure 
management’s control, authority, and responsibility over the firm’s assets.’”). See 
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China’s Regulations, a recurring pattern appears in these FCPA 
actions. U.S.-based direct sellers, as parent companies of Chinese 
subsidiaries, are held liable under the Act (or otherwise used as a 
vehicle for liability) for the subsidiary’s extraterritorial conduct in 
China, most often due to unlawful attempts to obtain, or maintain, 
Chinese market access under the 2005 Regulations. 
For instance, in 2014, Avon (notably the first foreign direct sales 
company to obtain a license under the Regulations)135 and its 
Chinese subsidiary, Avon China, both plead guilty to criminal 
violations of the FCPA anti-bribery provisions.136  Avon China 
“made $8 million worth of payments in cash, gifts, travel, and 
entertainment to gain access to Chinese officials implementing and 
overseeing direct selling regulations in China[.]”137  The unlawful 
payments were made in an attempt to maintain both its direct sales 
license and the significant financial benefits accrued therefrom.138  
According to an SEC statement, after obtaining the direct selling 
license, “sales revenue in China then ‘grew 44%[.]’”139  Further, 
after receiving the license, Avon “achieved operating profits of $3 
 
generally 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B) (containing the statutory text of the internal controls 
provision). 
 135 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Avon With FCPA 
Violations: Avon Entities to Pay $135 Million to Settle SEC and Criminal Cases (Dec. 17, 
2014), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2014-285.html 
[https://perma.cc/T777-J8VK].  Avon “received the first direct selling business license in 
China in March 2006.”  Id.; see also Miao, supra note 3, at 394. 
 136 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Avon China Pleads Guilty to Violating the 
FCPA by Concealing More Than $8 Million in Gifts to Chinese Officials (Dec. 17, 2014), 
available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/avon-china-pleads-guilty-violating-fcpa-
concealing-more-8-million-gifts-chinese-officials [https://perma.cc/8WE3-KY65]. 
 137 Payments “include[d] paid travel for Chinese government officials[,] . . . gifts such 
as Louis Vuitton merchandise, Gucci bags, Tiffany pens, and corporate box tickets[.]” 
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 135 (emphasis added); Complaint 
at 10–14, SEC v. Avon Products, Inc., No. 14-CV-9956 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2014). 
 138 “Avon’s subsidiary . . . paid millions of dollars to government officials to obtain a 
direct selling license and gain an edge over their competitors, and the company reaped 
substantial financial benefits as a result[.]”  Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
supra note 135 (internal quotations omitted).  The payments were made also to “avoid 
fines or negative news articles” impacting “Avon’s clean corporate image required to 
retain the license.”  Id. 
 139 Robert Appleton & Kenton Atta-Krah, Does Voluntary Disclosure Make More 
Sense After Goodyear?, LAW360 (Mar. 4, 2015), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/626656 [https://perma.cc/2XCG-X6UD]. 
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million” after incurring “a $1 million loss” the year before.140  Both 
entities incurred criminal penalties141 for these violations.  
Additionally, parent company Avon “agreed to implement rigorous 
internal controls, cooperate fully with the department and retain a 
compliance monitor for at least 18 months.”142 
Similarly, the adjacent action against Avon under the FCPA 
accounting provisions143  resulted in civil penalties of “more than 
$67.36 million”144 for each entity.  In determining this penalty, the 
SEC considered various factors such as Avon China’s failure to 
fairly and accurately record the nature and purpose of the 
payments145 and the parent company’s inadequate remedial efforts, 
such as missing correctional opportunities in its China subsidiary.146 
In 2016, the SEC brought an action against Nu Skin Enterprises, 
Inc. under the FCPA accounting provisions for extraterritorial acts 
of its China subsidiary (“Nu Skin China”).147  The unlawful payment 
that ultimately provoked the SEC action arose out of a Chinese 
provincial investigation against Nu Skin China for violation of the 
2005 Regulations.148  An internal Nu Skin China email evidenced 
the subsidiary’s unlawful intent underlying the improper payment 
by proposing an investigatory alternative where they were “not 
charged and . . . ‘donate[d] some money instead of a fine.’”149  To 
execute this endeavor, the subsidiary obtained the influence of a 
 
 140 Id. (emphasis added). 
 141 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 136 (reporting a total of 
“$67,648,000 in criminal penalties”). 
 142 Id. 
 143 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 135. 
 144 Id. (calculating this figure by totaling Avon’s agreed-upon disgorgement plus 
prejudgment interest). 
 145 See id. 
 146 See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 135; Appleton & Atta-
Krah, supra note 139. 
 147 SEC Charges Nu Skin Enterprises, Inc. with FCPA Violations, SEC (Sept. 20, 
2016), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-78884-s.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/87NU-UYF3]; see also In the Matter of Nu Skin Enterprises, Inc., Admin 
Proc. File No. 3-17556 (Sept. 20, 2016) at 2. 
 148 See In the Matter of Nu Skin, supra note 147, at 4.  The Chinese Administration of 
Industry and Commerce was investigating Nu Skin China for “unauthorized activities of 
its sales representatives” in violation of the Regulations, which threatened the subsidiary 
with a fine of $431,088 U.S.D. and potential trouble maintaining its direct selling license.  
See id. at 2-4. 
 149 Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 
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high-ranking Chinese official150 via a $154,000 “donation” to his 
charity.151  This “charitable” donation resulted in a written donation 
agreement152  and ceremony where the official spoke, praising Nu 
Skin China.153  Two days after the ceremony, it was announced that 
Nu Skin China “was neither charged nor fined”154 for the regulatory 
investigation.  Provoking the SEC action, on an expenditure 
authorization form,155 Nu Skin China unlawfully labeled the 
$154,000 payment as a charitable donation.156  In reality, the 
payment was made for the improper purpose of “influenc[ing a 
Chinese] Party Official to favorably impact the outcome of”157 a 
provincial investigation against Nu Skin China for violating the 
Regulations.158 
Like Avon, Nu Skin’s subsidiary committed the unlawful 
conduct, yet the parent company bore FCPA liability to the extent 
possible for: 
[failing to] devise and maintain a reasonable system of internal 
accounting controls over its subsidiary’s operations in China to 
ensure that transactions were recorded as necessary to maintain 
accountability for assets . . .  [G]iven the well-known corruption 
risks in China,159 Nu Skin did not ensure that adequate due 
diligence was conducted by Nu Skin China with respect to 
charitable donations to identify links to government or political 
party officials and to prevent payments intended to improperly 
influence such persons in violation of the company’s anti-
 
 150 Id. at 3–4. 
 151 Further indicative of improper motive was Nu Skin China’s agreement to obtain 
“college recommendation letters for the Party Official’s child” from “an influential U.S. 
person[.]”  Id. at 2–4. 
 152 The final version of this agreement, between Nu Skin China and the charity 
(unbeknownst to, and against the advice of U.S. counsel) omitted the suggested anti-
corruption language. See id. at 4. 
 153 Id. 
 154 In the Matter of Nu Skin, supra note 147, at 4. 
 155 Id.  
 156 Id. at 2, 4. 
 157 Id. at 4. 
 158 The Chinese Administration of Industry and Commerce was investigating Nu Skin 
China for “unauthorized activities of its sales representatives” in violation of the 
Regulations, which threatened the subsidiary with a fine of $431,088 U.S.D. and potential 
trouble maintaining its direct selling license.  See id. at 2-4. 
 159 See, e.g., Szto, supra note 100, at 596–603, 609–12, 620–27. 
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corruption policy and the FCPA.160 
Most recently, in 2019, the SEC brought an action against 
Herbalife under the Securities Act161 and the Exchange Act162 for 
unlawfully issuing false and misleading statements.163  In the 
settlement agreement,164 Herbalife agreed to pay a $20 million 
punitive fine.165  However, just six weeks after the SEC settlement, 
the DOJ indicted two former executives of an Herbalife subsidiary, 
Herbalife China166 for violating the anti-bribery and accounting 
provisions of the FCPA.167  Herbalife remains unnamed in the DOJ 
indictment, but circumstantial evidence and secondary sources 
indicate Herbalife as the MLM at issue that formerly employed 
defendants Yanliang Li and Hongwei Yang as high-level 
executives.168 
Again, like Avon and Nu Skin, the charges alleged attempts to 
maintain direct selling licenses under the Regulations.169  
Specifically, the DOJ alleged that defendants corruptly 
influenced170 Chinese governmental investigations and state-
 
 160 In the Matter of Nu Skin, supra note 147, at 4. 
 161 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a)(2)–(3). 
 162 See § 78m(a). 
 163 The SEC found certain statements in Herbalife’s quarterly and annual SEC filings 
untrue because they claimed to use a different business model in China when, in fact, its 
“compensation model in China” was “similar . . . to the one it employed in every other 
country[.]” The SEC found the statements “false and misleading[.]”  See Press Release, 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Herbalife to Pay $20 Million for Misleading Investors, (Sept. 27, 
2019), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-195 
[https://perma.cc/FU3L-SUF4] (emphasis added).  
 164 Herbalife neither admitted to nor denied the findings. See In the Matter of 
Herbalife Nutrition Ltd., Admin Proc. File No. 3-19536 (Sept. 27, 2019) at 1. 
 165 See, e.g., id. at 11; Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 163. 
 166 Herbalife operates in China “through a group of wholly owned subsidiaries based 
in China” as Herbalife China.  Bruce Zagaris, 2 Former Executives of Chinese Subsidiary 
of Herbal Life Charged with Corruption, 35 INT’L ENF’T L. REP. 407, 407 (2019).  The 
two former Herbalife China executives were Yanliang Li and Hongwei Yang, “also known 
as Mary Lang[.]”  Id.; Sealed Indictment at 3–5, United States v. Li, 19 Crim. 760 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2019) [hereinafter Herbalife Indictment]. 
 167 See Herbalife Indictment, supra note 166, at 6–18. 
 168 See, e.g., Zagaris, supra note 166, at 407–08; Herbalife Indictment, supra note 
166, ¶¶ 1-7. 
 169 Again, financial incentive appears plausible. As of 2016, “Herbalife China was 
responsible for approximately 20 percent of Herbalife’s worldwide net sales, which 
surpassed $4 billion.”  Zagaris, supra note 166, at 407. 
 170 Herbalife Indictment, supra note 166, at 7. 
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controlled media via unlawful payments.171   The alleged payments 
include, inter alia, round-trip airline tickets, a shopping trip and spa 
visit for a Chinese official, his daughter, and her classmates, an 
internship for a senior government official, and Herbalife China 
“receiving $772,433 in reimbursement [from its parent company] 
for purportedly entertaining 4,312 gov’t officials at 239 meals . . . 
and providing fruits and vegetables for officials.”172 
Additionally, defendants violated the FCPA accounting 
provisions by circumventing the parent company’s internal controls 
meant to prevent bribery and fraud.173  Similar to Nu Skin, 
Herbalife’s failure as a parent company to “identify, investigate, 
stop the payments, [or] take remedial action”174 indicated either “big 
flaws” in Herbalife’s international accounting procedures and 
controls, or that “persons in the parent organization also participated 
in the scheme.”175  Despite having thus far evaded immediate FCPA 
legal liability, Herbalife’s actions demonstrate the incidental 
consequences for parent companies in similar situations adversely 
affecting Herbalife’s “reputation, financial situation, and stock 
value.”176  Despite public disclosure and subsequent remedial 
action,177 Herbalife’s share value went down shortly after the DOJ 
indictment.178 
These FCPA enforcement actions exhibit the various forms of 
liability that parent companies may take on for a foreign subsidiary.  
These enforcement actions serve as warnings to foreign companies 
hoping to do business in China, calling for compliance with both the 
Regulations and the FCPA.179  Yet also latent in these actions is the 
tension between the FCPA’s bribery prohibition and participation 
in guanxi gift-giving as a practical necessary for successful, 
 
 171 See Zagaris, supra note 166, at 408. 
 172 Id. 
 173 See Herbalife Indictment, supra note 166, at 14–16; see also Zagaris, supra note 
166, at 407-08. 
 174 Zagaris, supra note 166, at 409. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. 
 177 See id. 
 178 Id.  Shortly after the indictment, Herbalife shares went down 30 cents (0.7%), from 
$43.50.  Id. at n.12.  In addition to “substantial fines, penalties, and disgorge profits[,]” 
Herbalife “will likely have to have a monitor for years into the future, for which it will 
need to pay.”  Id. at 409. 
 179 See id. 
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effective business in China.180  Lastly, these actions each allude 
implicitly (and undeniably) to an arbitrary, undefined degree of 
Chinese governmental involvement in China’s direct selling 
industry.181 
A. Enforcement Actions & Patterns in China 
While harsh on their face, actual enforcement of the 2005 
Regulations in China proves isolated and unpredictable.182  Besides 
a few high-profile cases183 imposing strict penalties or punishments 
for blatant corruption, more mundane enforcement remains 
arbitrary, isolated, and often haphazard.184  The direct selling 
industry should remain aware of potentially arbitrary or selective 
enforcement of the Regulations in China.185 
However, recent industry developments and current events in 
China may create harsher enforcement of the Regulations by 
Chinese governmental authorities.186  For instance, as recently as 
September 2019, the Chinese government was conducting random 
compliance checks for direct selling companies.187  Further, as of 
February 2019, the direct selling licensure system was suspended 
 
 180 See, e.g., Szto, supra note 100, 592–93, 620, 626. (discussing Chinese gift-giving 
culture and the inherent risk of violating the FCPA and considering whether gift-giving of 
Chinese culture can be used simultaneously to fight corruption); see also supra Section 
IV-B (discussing the Chinese cultural value of guanxi). 
 181 See, e.g., Jeffery, supra note 63, at 39–40; Pomfret, supra note 69; Wong, supra 
note 74, at 280–81. 
 182 See, e.g., Rubo, supra note 11. 
 183 See, e.g., Leader of China’s $9 Billion Ezubao Online Scam Gets Life; 26 Jailed, 
REUTERS (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-fraud/leader-of-
chinas-9-billion-ezubao-online-scam-gets-life-26-jailed-idUSKCN1BN0J6 
[https://perma.cc/B7ZU-77CM] (providing an overview of the Ezubao case). 
 184 Rubo, supra note 11; McMorrow & Myers, supra note 5. 
 185 Rubo, supra note 11; see also Szto, supra note 100, at 592 (pointing out that 
“China is considered a high-risk business environment”); Ivan Franceschini, Labour NGOs 
in China: A Real Force for Political Change?, 281 CHINA Q. 474, 475–78 (2014) 
(suggesting heightened power in governmental enforcement of regulations and laws, no 
matter how selective or arbitrary); supra Section V.  Without consistent enforcement, 
illegal domestic Chinese pyramid schemes and their often pervasive corruption will not 
disappear.  See, e.g., Huifeng, supra note 11; Rubo, supra note 11; Jeffery, supra note 63, 
at 39–40; Pomfret, supra note 69; Wong, supra note 74, at 257–58. 
 186 Heather Martin, 5 Events That Impacted Direct Selling in 2019, JUFULLY MEDIA 
(Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.zxfull.com/en/80-resources/focus/8825-5-events-that-
impacted-direct-selling-in-2019 [https://perma.cc/8TZV-NQKB]. 
187 Id. 
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pending a comprehensive national industry review, and Chinese 
authorities were discussing, inter alia, “establish[ing] a black list 
for discredited direct sellers and players, [and] increas[ing] the cost 
for violation of laws and dishonest behaviors[.]”188  In light of 
potentially heightened enforcement of the Regulations in China, 
direct selling companies with business in China should consider and 
ensure compliance efforts accordingly, while remaining aware of 
potentially arbitrary or selective enforcement in China. 
VI. Transnational Direct Selling in China—Current State of 
Affairs: 2018’s Record-Breaking Industry Figures and 
2019 Fourth Quarter Declines for Industry Leaders 
Direct selling’s declining fourth quarter figures for industry 
leaders in 2019 were often linked to Chinese market performance or 
presence.  In 2018, the industry remained lucrative and profitable.  
The global direct sales industry experienced $192.9 billion in global 
retail sales for the 2018 fiscal year (ending December 31, 2018), 
demonstrating an annual 1.7% compounded increase for 2015-
2018.189  As of 2018, China was the largest direct selling market in 
the world (with the United States close behind in second), boasting 
$35,731 billion USD in retail sales for 2018.190  Likewise, direct 
selling’s global “sales force” broke records in 2018 with “a total of 
118.4 million people involved in direct selling globally”191 
including “over 53 million Independent Representatives[.]”192  
However, looking at major direct sellers’ 2019 fourth quarter and 
2019 growth performances,193 which “give some significant 
 
 188 Feng, Spokesperson, Ministry of Com. of China (MOFCOM), supra note 52. 
 189 WFDSA Announces Record-Setting 2018 Direct Selling Business Results, WORLD 
FED’N OF DIRECT SELLING ASS’NS (June 3, 2019), https://wfdsa.org/wfdsa-announces-
record-setting-2018-direct-selling-business-results/ [https://perma.cc/P3PC-7MWU] 
[Hereinafter Record-Setting 2018]; FACT SHEET, supra note 3, at 1; see WORLD FED’N OF 
DIRECT SELLING ASS’NS, GLOBAL DIRECT SELLING 2018 (2019), https://wfdsa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/06/WFDSA-Fact-sheet-2018_F.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5ZA-
HLUQ] [hereinafter GLOBAL DIRECT SELLING 2018]. 
 190 WORLD FED’N OF DIRECT SELLING ASS’N’S, WFDSA 2018/2019 ANNUAL REPORT 
23 (2019), https://wfdsa.org/initiatives-and-resources/publications/ 
[https://perma.cc/MGL6-V9LF]; GLOBAL DIRECT SELLING 2018, supra note 189.  The 
United States was close behind China, with $35,350 billion U.S. dollars in retail sales for 
the year of 2018.  See id. 
 191  GLOBAL DIRECT SELLING 2018, supra note 189. 
 192 See Record-Setting 2018, supra note 189. 
 193 Hakki Ozmorali, 2019 in a Few Major Companies’ Figures, WORLD OF DIRECT 
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indications”194 as to “the sentiment or the trends in the industry,”195 
the permanence of the industry’s record-breaking numbers in 2018 
proves speculative, especially within China. 
For instance, despite experiencing 2.8% growth compared to its 
2018 fourth quarter figures, Herbalife experienced a 15% sales 
decline in China.196  However, on the whole, Herbalife ended 2019 
with a revenue figure very similar to its 2018 fiscal year.197  
Herbalife management has not offered “any guidance for 2020,”198 
yet it plans to update guidance “when they c[an] reasonably 
estimate . . . the extent of impact from the Coronavirus.”199 
Alternatively, Nu Skin experienced a 10% annual revenue 
decline in 2019, due in large part to its China market.200  While the 
company’s “customer base remained relatively strong”201  in the 
fourth quarter, its “sales leader count was down . . . primarily driven 
by a decline in Mainland China.”202  Nu Skin’s China sales “dropped 
by 29% or by $63 million on a quarterly basis[,]” attributing 2/3 of 
Nu Skin’s overall sales decline to its performance in Mainland 
 
SELLING (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.worldofdirectselling.com/2019-in-direct-sales-in-
figures/ [https://perma.cc/7LHG-SW93]. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. 
 197  Herbalife “ended the year with a revenue figure ($4.877 b) very close to last year’s 
($4.892 b).”  Id. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Ozmorali, supra note 193.  The implications of COVID-19 for global direct selling 
exceed this Note’s scope and prove too recent for accurate prediction.  For more 
information on how the COVID-19 pandemic could impact not only direct selling, but 
world trade as a whole. See, e.g., COVID-19 and World Trade, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/ 
covid19_e.htm [https://perma.cc/8U93-MJ48] (last visited Oct. 2, 2020) (providing an 
overview of current global trade status and links to further sources); E-Commerce, Trade 
and the COVID-19 Pandemic: Information Note, WTO 1, 1 (May 4, 2020), 
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China.203  That said, besides for marginal growth in Japan, “none of 
Nu Skin’s other units posted growth in Q4[.]”204  Nu Skin’s 
management foresees 5 to 10% negative growth in 2020, but 
predicts positive growth will return in the fourth quarter when it 
launches “a new beauty device.”205  “Their projected sales decline 
in Mainland China for [2020] is 20 to 25%.”206 
Lastly, USANA Health Sciences (“USANA”), a global direct 
selling company dependent upon China for “about half of [the] 
company’s global revenue[,] . . . basically does not have strong 
presence in markets outside of Asia.”207  It experienced a 9% decline 
in the 2019 fourth quarter compared to the same quarter in 2018,208 
closing 2019 with an 11% decrease in total global sales209 and a 
significant decrease in total active customers.210  USANA 
management makes no predictions for significant growth in 2020.211 
Already speculative, the viability of global direct selling, both 
in China and beyond, proves even more dubious in light of the 
potential impending effects of COVID-19.  Thus, the industry, 
particularly transnational direct selling entities conducting business 
in Mainland China, must not assume that they will continue to 
experience monetary success in the future. 
VII. Resolving Dissonant National Policies in Transnational 
Direct Selling: Effective Legal Standards and/or Best 
Business Practices 
Internationally-uniform legal standards in direct selling prove 
lacking yet necessary, but the industry remains legally complex, 
both in terminology and national customs.212  Certain best practices 
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for transnational direct selling companies conducting business in 
China may prove more effective for dodging threats of enforcement 
until U.S. or Chinese national policy resolves existing tensions 
between the 2005 Regulations and the FCPA. 
The direct selling industry must balance the interests of 
“enterprises, the consumers[,] and the regulators[.]”213  Considering 
China’s national socioeconomic conditions”214 makes it clear that 
these three entities interact completely differently than they do 
within the United States.  Chinese “regulators” often share interests 
or control with “enterprises” and the market post-China’s delayed 
economic liberalization engenders more stringent oversight of 
private business in opposition to the United States’ open economy 
policy and practices.215  Similarly, as seen in the national history 
underlying the 2005 Regulations and 1998 direct selling ban, 
China’s “regulators” often maintain implicit control over 
“consumers.”216  After considering such Chinese national 
conditions, and longstanding national tensions with the direct 
selling industry, a necessary, admittedly idealistic, industry goal: 
regaining Chinese national trust. 
Internal anti-corruption safeguards prove immediately crucial for 
direct selling companies doing business in China, regardless of 
whether industry leaders incorporate broader, ideological 
suggestions tailored to Chinese national culture and history as 
related to direct selling.  Implementation of internal anti-corruption 
practices proves most vital because gift-giving must not arise to 
unlawful bribery under Chinese or U.S. law, regardless of benefits 
accrued by foreign enterprises doing business in China from 
cultivating guanxi via gift-giving.  Otherwise, enforcement is likely, 
and fair, in either country.  U.S.-based parent companies must 
implement stringent internal anti-corruption policies, practices, and 
enforcement to avoid potential liability under the FCPA for their 
Chinese subsidiaries’ extraterritorial conduct.  Unless and until 
legislative policy shifts adapts to reconcile underlying policy 
differences between the FCPA and Chinese best business practices, 
transnational direct selling companies must tread carefully when 
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conducting business in China to ensure compliance with both the 
2005 Regulations and the FCPA. 
